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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TRIAL BY JURY GUARANTY OF SEVENTH
AMENDMENT: LOCAL COURT RULE MAY ESTABLISH NUMBER OF
JURORS AT SIX IN FEDERAL CIVIL CAS ES-Colgrove v. Battin, 413
U.S. 149 (1973).
In the late 1960s, dockets in federal courts were becoming increas-
ingly crowded, the backlog of criminal cases having more than dou-
bled in the decade 1958-68.1 One suggestion for relieving pressure on
the dockets was reduction of jury size in civil jury trials from 12 to
some lesser number. 2 In the absence of a constitutional amendment,
however, the seventh amendment appeared to bar such a reduction in
jury size. Nevertheless, within the span of a few years the Supreme
Court was to announce a series of decisions 3 which eliminated the
constitutional significance of the number 12 and permitted the adop-
tion of the 6-member jury. This judicial revolution reached its culmi-
nation last Term in Colgrove v. Battin,4 which eliminated the require-
ment of a 12-member jury in civil trials in federal courts.
Colgrove's diversity case was set for trial before a jury of six in
compliance with Local Rule 13(d)(1) of the United States District
1. New York Times, Feb. 9, 1969, § 4, at 8, col. 1.
2. Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed ConstitutionalAmendmnent, 51 GEO.
L.J. 120 (1962). The use of smaller juries would clearly result in a significant reduc-
tion in both the cost of jury trial and the amount of time such trials consume. When the
number of jurors necessary to conduct trial proceedings is reduced by one-half, the
amount of money paid out in jury fees will also be halved. Savings would also occur
because such expenses as mileage, meals and accommodations would be reduced in di-
rect relation to any reduction in the size of the jury. Administrative time and expense
would be reduced because fewer persons would have to be summoned to jury duty. A
significant amount of deliberation time would be conserved. See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, A COMPARISON OF SIX- AND TWELVE-MEMBER JURIES IN CIVIL CASES
IN NEWJERSEY SUPERIOR AND COUNTY COURTS 7 (1972). The amount of time required to
conduct voir dire would also probably be reduced. While there is some debate on this
issue (see Pabst. Statistical Studies of the Costs of Six-Matz Versus Twelve-Man Juries,
14 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 326 (1972)), the consensus of the literature is that questioning
6 persons consumes less time than questioning 12 persons. See, e.g., Augelli, Six
Member Juries in Civil Actions in the Federal Judicial System, 3 SETON HALL L.
REV. 281 (1972); Croake, Memorandum on the Advisability and Constitutionality
of Six Matt Juries and 516 Verdicts in Civil Cases, 44 N.Y. ST. B.J. 385 (1972): Note.
Reducing the Size of Juries, 5 U. Micii. J. L. REFORM 87 (197 1). One empirical study on
the reduction of civil juries to 6 members and the trial time saved thereby concluded
that it required approximately 40% less judge and lawyer time to select a jury of 6
compared to ajury of 12. 1962 ILL. JUD. CONF., EXEC. COMM. ANN. REP. 64.
3. See text accompanying notes 18-26 supra.
4. 413 U.S. 149(1973).
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Court for the District of Montana. 5 Colgrove sought a writ of man-
damus from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals directing the district
court judge to impanel a 12-member jury. He contended that the local
rule violated the seventh amendment, 6 violated the statutory provision
in 28 U.S.C. § 2072 that court rules "shall preserve the right of trial
by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment
..... , and was invalid because inconsistent with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 48 which provides for juries of less than 12 only
when stipulated by the parties. 8 The Ninth Circuit rejected these con-
tentions, sustained the validity of the local rule and denied the writ.9
The United States Supreme Court in a five to four decision affirmed,
holding that the use of six-member juries in federal civil jury trials vi-
olates neither the Constitution, the statute nor the rule of procedure.
Most significantly, the Court rejected both contentions offered to sus-
tain Colgrove's constitutional argument. First, the Court dismissed the
contention that the seventh amendment preserved the incidental char-
acteristics, as well as the substance, of trial by jury in civil cases at
common law. Second, the Court held that a jury composed of exactly
12 members is not part of the substantive right which is preserved.
This note examines the logic and reasoning behind the Court's
important 10 determination that the Constitution does not bar federal
civil juries of less than 12. It is submitted that while a convincing pre-
ponderance of the available empirical evidence supports the majority's
5. D. MONT. R. 13(d)(1) provides: "A jury for the trial of civil cases shall consist of
six persons plus such alternate jurors as may be impaneled."
6. The seventh amendment provides: "In suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law."
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970) provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, the form of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the dis-
trict courts of the United States in civil actions. Such rules shall not abridge, en-
large or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the right of trial by jury as
at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
8. This Rule provides: "The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any
number less than twelve or that a verdict or a finding of a stated majority of the jurors
shall be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury."
9. Colgrove v. Battin, 456 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1972).
10. The Supreme Court has stated: "Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body
is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that
any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
care." Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
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conclusion that there is no functional difference between civil juries of
6 and 12, the Court weakened the force of its reasoning by failing to
emphasize this evidence and by relying too heavily on its much criti-
cized opinion in Williams v. Florida.1
1. TRIAL BY JURY AND THE NUMBER "12"
In Maxwell v. Dow,12 the Court had implied that not only was a
jury composed of 12 jurors required by the sixth amendment 13 in fed-
11. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). For critical reviews of Williams, see, e.g., Zeisel .... And
Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 710
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Zeisel]: Note. The Effect of Jury Size on the Probability of
Conviction: An Evaluation of Williams v. Florida, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 529
(1971): Comment, Florida's Six-Member Criminal Juries: Constitutional, But Are They
Fair? 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 402 (1971). One of the most valid criticisms of Williams con-
cerns the response ofJustice White, writing for the Court. to the contention that if a jury
can be reduced from 12 to 6 then there is nothing to prevent it from being further re-
duced to 4 or 2 or even 1. Justice White responded that one "can get off the 'slippery
slope' before he reaches the bottom .... ." 399 U.S. at 91 n.28. However, as Justice
Marshall pointed out in his dissent in Colgrove: "This begs the question how one
knows at what point to get off .. ." 413 U.S. at 181 n.9.
Another criticism of Williams is the Court's failure to deal satisfactorily with the issue
of the "hung"jury. The national average for jury trials in which 12-member juries fail to
reach a verdict is 5.6%. H. KALVEN & H. ZEiSEL, TiIE AMERICAN JURY 461 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as KALVEN & ZEISEL]. Data from Florida, where six-member crim-
inal juries are used, indicates that the average for jury trials in which six-member juries
fail to reach a verdict is only 2.4%. Zeisel at 720. Smaller juries "hang" less fre-
quently for two major reasons: (1) There are fewer minority positions represented on
the jury (see note 47 and text accompanying notes 49 & 50 infra): and (2) if a dissenter
does appear, in a smaller group he is more likely to be the only dissident on the jury.
Lacking any associate to support his position, he is more likely to abandon it. This
second proposition is based on results of the University of Chicago jury project which
demonstrate that to maintain his original position, a group member must have at least
one ally. KALVEN & ZEISEL at 462-63. Obviously one is more likely to find an ally in the
larger jury.
It is true that these contentions are more compelling with respect to criminal jury
trials where unanimity is still generally required and one holdout can prevent convic-
tion or acquittal; cf. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972): Apodaca v. Oregon. 406
U.S. 404 (1972). However, even in civil jury trials, where five-sixths verdicts are fre-
quently allowed, hung juries are not impossible, in fact, a majority of all hung jury cases
divide six to six, seven to five, eight to four, or nine to three. KALVEN & ZEISEL at 460.
The Williams Court dismissed the issue of hung juries with only brief discussion. The
Court concluded that whatever advantage one party might find in the increased possi-
bility of one or more jurors holding out for his view and thus preventing an unfavorable
verdict is offset by the advantage which might just as easily belong to the other party if
jurors favoring his view were in the minority. 399 U.S. at 101. While this conclusion
may be valid for civil cases, it is unwarranted with respect to criminal cases like Wil-
liatms because statistics demonstrate that in the vast majority of hung jury cases the split
favors the prosecution. KALVEN & ZEISEL at 460.
12. 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
13. The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions. the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ......
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eral criminal cases, but the availability of such a jury also was insured
by the seventh amendment in federal civil cases. 14 The Court reiter-
ated this view in Patton v. United States:15 "A constitutional jury
means twelve men as though that number had been specifically
named. n16 Although both cases involved juries in criminal cases and
thus were limited in a strict sense to an interpretation of the sixth
amendment, the Court evidenced its view in dicta as to civil cases as
well.17
However, beginning with Duncan v. Louisiana18 in 1968 and cul-
minating with Colgrove in 1973, the Court executed a complete re-
versal of its earlier view of the constitutional stature of trial by jury. In
Duncan the Court reversed its holding in Maxwell that the sixth
amendment was not made applicable to the states by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 9 Justice Harlan's dissent in
Duncan foreshadowed the change in the Court's direction which was
to be revealed by subsequent decisions: "[T] he rule, imposed long
ago in federal courts, that 'jury' means 'jury of exactly twelve,' is not
fundamental to anything: there is no significance except to mystics in
the number 12."20
The traditional insistence upon 12 members as an essential element
of trial by jury was explicitly abandoned by the Supreme Court in
Williams v. Florida.2z In Williams, the defendant, convicted of rob-
bery by a Florida 6-member criminal jury, asserted that the trial
judge's refusal to impanel a 12-member jury was a violation of his
sixth amendment right to trial by jury. The Supreme Court held Flori-
14. 176 U.S. at 586. The Court nevertheless upheld Utah's eight-member jury be-
cause the sixth amendment was held to be not applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment.
15. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
16. Id. at 292. See also Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898); Rasmussen v.
United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905).
17. See American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897); Capital Traction
Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. I (1899).
18. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
19. See note 14 supra. It should be noted that the seventh amendment is one of the
few remaining provisions of the Bill of Rights which has not been held to be applicable
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g.,
Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931);
Wagner Electric Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226, 232 (1923). Although the Court has
not specifically considered the constitutionality of juries of less than 12 in state civil
trials, in light of Colgrove the possibility of sustaining a challenge to such juries is nil.
20. 391 U.S. at 182.
21. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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da's use of 6-member criminal juries in noncapital cases did not vio-
late the defendant's constitutional rights, the common law require-
ment of precisely 12 jurors being an historical accident, 22 unnecessary
to effect the purpose of the jury system. 23 This accidental feature
could not have been immutably codified into the Constitution, the
Court stated, because "there is absolutely no indication in 'the intent
of the Framers' of an explicit decision to equate the constitutional and
common law characteristics of the jury. 24
Colgrove applied the Williams rationale to the federal civil jury.
Although significant differences exist between the facts of Williams
and those of Colgrove, particularly the state-federal and criminal-civil
distinctions, the Colgrove Court consistently deemphasized these dif-
ferences. For the Court, the only constitutional issue presented in
Colgrove which Williams left unanswered was "whether 'additional
references to the "common law" that occur in the Seventh Amend-
ment might support a different interpretation' with respect to jury trial
in civil cases."'25 The Court concluded that the references do not sup-
port such an interpretation, stating: "In short, what was said in Wil-
liams with respect to the criminal jury is equally applicable here: con-
stitutional history reveals no intention on the part of the Framers 'to
equate the constitutional and common-law characteristics of the
jury.' ",26
The Colgrove Court's interpretation of the constitutional issue was
both clear and logical. The majority reasoned that the language of the
seventh amendment preserving the right to trial by jury in suits at
common law is not directed to jury characteristics such as size, but
rather defines the kind of cases for which jury trial is preserved. The
Court pointed out that by referring to the "common law" the framers
of the seventh amendment were concerned with preserving the sub-
stantive right of trial by jury in civil cases where it existed at common
law, rather than with mere matters of form and procedure. In deter-
22. This conclusion has not gone unchallenged. One commentator has suggested that
the number 12 is not an historical accident, but rather the result of centuries of trial and
error, seeking a number that optimizes the jury's two conflicting goals--to represent the
community as broadly as possible, yet at the same time to remain a group of manage-
able size. Zeisel, supra note 11, at 712.
23. 399 U.S. at 89. See text accompanying notes 34 & 35 infra.
24. 399 U.S. at 99.
25. 413 U.S. at 152.
26. Id. at 156.
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mining whether a 12-member jury is a substantive aspect of the
common law right of trial by jury, the Court declared that the relevant
inquiry is whether jury performance is a function of jury size. The
Court concluded: "[I] t cannot be said that 12 members is a substan-
tive aspect of the right of trial by jury. '27
The dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall vehemently objected to
the majority's disposition of the constitutional issue.28 Joined by Jus-
tice Stewart,2 9 Justice Marshall contended that the majority is respon-
sible for the wholesale abolition of the civil jury, and for its replace-
ment by a different institution, one "which functions differently, pro-
duces different results, and was wholly unknown to the Framers of the
Seventh Amendment. '30 His argument rests upon the inclusion in the
seventh amendment of the specific language, "In suits at common law
• .. the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . ." (emphasis
added). He interpreted this language to suggest strongly that the con-
tent of that right is to be judged by historical standards.3' Justice
Marshall pointed out that the majority abandoned a long line of pre-
27. Id. at 157.
28. Justice Marshall was the lone dissenter on the 6-member jury issue in Williams
v. Florida, where he first expressed his opposition to the view that the constitutional
guaranty of trial by jury does not include the characteristic of exactly 12 jurors. 399
U.S. at 116.
29. Justice Stewart voted with the majority in Williams, but on the separate concur-
ring ground that the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury in criminal cases is not ap-
plied to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 143. See also Duncan v. Louis-
iana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Harlan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
30. 413 U.S. at 166-67 (footnotes omitted). Justices Marshall and Stewart also disa-
greed with the majority's holding that the statute does not bar six-member federal civil
juries. Their dissent contended that Congress intended to preserve the specific character-
istics of trial by jury at common law. Id. at 185. The majority rejected this view in its
finding that Congress' sole purpose in using the language in question was to create a sta-
tutory right coextensive with that right guaranteed by the seventh amendment. Id. at
162-63. The majority rested its finding on the belief that Congress would not saddle the
federal courts with archaic and unworkable common law procedures. Id. at 161.
Justices Marshall and Stewart further dissented from the majority's determination
that D. MONT. R. 13(d)(1), supra note 5, providing for federal civil juries of six mem-
bers, is not inconsistent with FED. R. Civ. P. 48, supra note 8. 413 U.S. at 185. This view
was shared by Justices Douglas and Powell, each of whom dissented on this ground
alone without reaching the constitutional issue. The minority view was that the federal
rule and the local rule do not mesh, but rather collide. According to this view, the only
way a federal civil case can be tried before a jury of less than 12 is by stipulation of the
parties. Id. at 165.
The majority rejected this interpretation, contending that the implication that FED. R.
Civ. P. 48 directs the impanelment of juries of 12 in the absence of stipulation is valid
only if the seventh amendment requires a jury of 12. Having found no such constitu-
tional requirement, the majority rejected the implication and held, "there is nothing in
the Rule with which the Local Rule is inconsistent." 413 U.S.at 163.
31. 413U.S.atl7l.
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cedent supporting the requirement of 12-member juries32 and adopted
instead a functional analysis which asks whether some substitute for
the common law jury adequately performs the same functions as a
jury. Putting aside the inquiry whether, under a functional analysis,
there is a difference between the results reached by the two different-
sized juries, the dissent questioned the validity of using a functional
approach to resolve this constitutional issue. Justice Marshall pre-
ferred the simple historical test of the constitutionality of a civil jury:
whether the jury is composed of 12 members. He rejected the majority
opinion because it requires an arbitrary line-drawing between what is
and what is not sufficient satisfaction of the goals of trial by jury. He
contended that the "fixed bounds of history" provide a more reliable
standard. 33
A careful evaluation of the purpose of the jury system supports the
majority's conclusion. In Williams the Court stated that the essential
feature of a jury lies: "in the interposition between the accused and his
accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in
the community participation and shared responsibility that results
from that group's determination of guilt or innocence." 34
The Court continued: "[T] he number [of jurors] should probably
be large enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside at-
tempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a
representative cross-section of the community." 35 Clearly, these goals
can be achieved as well by a jury of less than 12 as by a jury of 12.
Certainly a group need not be composed of precisely 12 in order to
deliberate effectively or provide the mere possibility of representing a
cross section of the community. Instead of labeling the issue irrele-
vant, the dissent would have been on stronger ground had it concen-
trated argument on the dispositional differences which it concluded
32. The majority justified its divergence from the Capital Traction Co. v. Hof. 174
U.S. 1 (1899), line of cases by stating that its canvass of relevant constitutional history
both here and in Williams casts considerable doubt on the easy assumption in past
decisions that if a feature existed in a jury at common law. then it was necessarily pre-
served in the Constitution. The Court held that references in Hof, American Publishing
Co. v. Fisher. 166 U.S. 464 (1897), and Maxwell v. Dow. 176 U.S. 581 (1900). were
clearly dicta and not decisions upon a question presented or litigated. 413 U.S. at 157.
The Court concluded that these earlier decisions must be denied the authority of decided
precedent.
33. Id. at 182.
34. 399 U.S. at 100.
35. Id.
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exist between the two different-sized juries.36 There is evidence sup-
porting both sides of the controversy over the effect of jury size on
jury results. The remainder of this note will evaluate that evidence.
II. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO THE DETERMINA-
TION OF JURY SIZE
The Supreme Court's ultimate determination that the 12-member
requirement cannot be regarded as an indispensable component of the
constitutional guaranty of trial by jury in either criminal or civil cases
is based on a functional approach. Such an approach focuses on the
effect of jury size on jury performance.37 Using this approach, the
Williams Court reached the conclusion, essential to the holdings in
both Williams and Colgrove, that "certainly the reliability of the jury
as a fact-finder hardly seems likely to be a function of its size."'38 Un-
fortunately, this conclusion rests upon the absence of evidence pre-
sented to the Court to demonstrate a functional relationship between
jury size and jury reliability, rather than the presence of evidence
proving no such relationship exists. To support its conclusion that
"there is no discernible difference between the results reached by the
two different-sized juries.. .. "39 the Williams Court relied upon the
results of several experiments with less than 12-member juries.40 The
evidence provided by these experiments is not, however, highly per-
suasive. None of the articles cited by the Court was based on empir-
ical investigation, instead each consisted exclusively of the personal
opinion of judges, attorneys or court clerks possessing only limited
experience with juries of less than 12 members. Further doubt is cast
upon the authority of these sources for a decision regarding a criminal
jury trial such as that held in Williams by the fact that in every case
these experiments concerned civil jury trials. Yet, on the basis of this
36. 413 U.S. at 167-68 n. 1; see notes 47-48 infra.
37. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
38. 399 U.S. at 100-01.
39. 399U.S. at 101.
40. Wiehl, The Six Man Jury, 4 GONZAGA L. REV. 35, 40-41 (1968); Tamm, The
Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 51 GEO. L. REV. 120,
134-36 (1962); Cronin, Six-Member Juries in District Courts, 2 BOSTON BJ. No. 4 at 27
(1958); New Jersey Experiments with Six-Man Jury, 9 BULL. OF THE SECTION OF
JUD. AD. OF THE A.B.A. (May, 1966); Phillips, A Jury of Six in All Cases, 30 CONN.
BJ. 354 (1956).
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evidence alone, the Williams Court sustained the contention that the
reliability of the jury as factfinder is not a function of its size.
In Colgrove, the Court persisted in resting its holding on the sup-
posed absence of evidence disproving its determination, despite the
fact that there were some significant new studies lending substantial
support to its conclusion 4t-as well as some tending to refute it.42
Although available evidence as to the operational effect of reducing
the number of jurors was limited to personal opinion at the time of the
Williams decision, by the time of Colgrove a significant amount of
empirical evidence existed supporting the Court's position. Although
four recent studies43 provide convincing evidence that there is no dif-
ference between the verdicts rendered by 6-member and 12-member
civil juries, 44 the Court chose not to rest its decision on this empirical
evidence, relegating the studies to a footnote. 45
41. Note, Six-Member and Twelve-Memnber Juries: An Empirical Study of Trial
Results, 6 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 671 (1973): Note, An Empirical Study of Six- and
Twele-Member Jury Decision-Making Processes, 6 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 712 (1973):
Bermant & Coppock, Outcomes of Six- and Twelve-Menber Jury Trials: An Analysis
of 128 Civil Cases in the State of Washington, 48 WASH. L. REV. 593 (1973): INSTITUTE
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, A COMPARISON OF SIX-AND TWELVE-MEMBER JURIES IN
Civil CASES IN NEw JERSEY SUPERIOR AND COUNTY COURTS (1972).
Professor Hans Zeisel has criticized sharply the methodologies employed by these
four studies. Zeisel & Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evidence" on the Six Member
Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (1974) ("It would be unfair, however, to place the blame
for accepting unsatisfactory evidence entirely on the Supreme Court. If lawyers and sci-
entists write poor studies, and if legal journals publish them, the courts should be enti-
tled to cite them." Id. at 292).
42. See generally Zeisel, supra note I1; Comment, Florida's Six-Member Criminal
Juries: Constitutional, But Are They Fair? 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 402 (197 1): see text ac-
companying notes 47-50 infra.
43. See note 41 .vtpra.
44. These studies merit detailed attention. An Empirical Study of Trial Results,
supra note 41. is based on the results of civil cases in the Wayne County, Michigan. Cir-
cuit Court for two one-year periods. The first saw 12-member juries utilized by the
court, the second 6-member juries. The author's evidence supports the hypothesis that a
6-member jury renders verdicts in favor of plaintiffs and defendants in the same propor-
tion as the 12-member jury renders its verdicts. The evidence also supports the
hypothesis that in rendering a money judgment for the plaintiff, the 6-member jury's
damage awards are identical to the 12-member jury's awards. In An Empirical Study
of Six- and Twelve-Member Jury Decision-Making Processes, supra note 41, the
author's hypotheses are directed at more specific aspects of the functioning of the
jury. For example. the author states that the number of issues discussed by a jury is
an indication of its function as a factfinder, and then points out that the evidence
supports the conclusion that no difference exists between the number of issues dis-
cussed by 6- and l?-rnember juries. Most importantly, the evidence of this study
supports the hypothesis that there is no difference between the verdicts rendered by
6- and 12-member juries.
In the Washington State study, supra note 41, the cases considered arose under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and all were tried during the calendar year 1970. After
1154
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Not only did the Court fail to consider this favorable evidence, but
it neglected unfavorable evidence as well. Referring to its rejection in
Williams of the assertion that the reliability of the jury as factfinder is
a function of jury size, the Colgrove Court stated, "nothing has been
suggested to lead us to alter that conclusion. ' 46 This contention is
dubious. The Court evidently attached little import to a study by Pro-
fessor Hans Zeisel, a leading authority on the civil jury. Based upon
an impressive statistical demonstration, the study concludes that re-
ducing the size of the jury will make it less likely to represent a fair
cross section of the community.47 Professor Zeisel contends that this
difference in representation of various community viewpoints is likely
to result in significant dispositional differences. 48 Furthermore, a stu-
dent writer has clearly indicated the effect that utilization of
six-member juries has upon minority representation. 49 As an example,
studying the results of ninety-five 12-member jury cases and thirty-three 6-member jury
cases, the authors found the distribution of decisions between plaintiffs and defendants
were virtualfy identical in 6- and 12-member juries. They concluded that the use of the
smaller jury introduced no systematic bias into the trial outcomes. The New Jersey
study. supra note 41, concludes that the use of six-member juries in civil cases does not
affect the conduct or outcome of trials. The evidence from this empirical study tends to
show that there is little difference in the soundness of verdicts awarded by 6- and
12-member juries.
45. 413 U.S. at 159-60 n.15. Furthermore, the Court could have relied upon empir-
ical small group studies which have demonstrated that as the size of a group increases,
the percentage of those members participating at a minimal level also increases. See,
e.g., Hire, A Study of Interaction and Consenrsts in Different Sized Groups, 17 AM.
Soc. REv. 261, 266 (1952). Whether the reason for this behavioral change is the individu-
al's fear of a relatively larger audience, or the belief that his opinion is not important in
so large a group, or some other reason, the fact remains that when the size of the group is
reduced group discussion is stimulated, thereby improving the quality of the delibera-
tive process.
46. 413 U.S. at 157. Making specific reference to its earlier reliance on the results of
the experiments with civil juries of less than 12, the Court noted: "Since then, much has
been written about the six-member jury, but nothing that persuades us to depart from
the conclusion reached in Williams." 413 U.S. at 158-59.
47. Professor Zeisel uses a model in which he assumes that 90% of a hypothet-
ical community shares the same viewpoint, while 10% have a different viewpoint.
Of 100 12-member juries randomly selected from such a community, 72 would have at
least one member of the minority group, while of 100 6-member juries so selected,
only 47 would have a minority member. The chance of having more than one minority
member is 34 out of 100 with the 12-member jury system, but only 11 out of 100 with
the 6-member system. Zeisel, supra note 11, at 716.
48. Id. at 716-20. Justice Marshall in his dissent in Colgrove cites the Zeisel study
to support his contention that variations in jury size produce variations in function and
result. 413 U.S. at 167-68 n.1. The majority opinion, however, merely includes the ar-
ticle in a rather extensive listing of arguments pro and con the effectiveness of a jury of
6 compared to a jury of 12. 413 U.S. at 159-60 n.15.
49. Comment, Florida's Six-Member Criminal Juries: Constitutional, But Are They
Fair?, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 402 (1971).
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he presents the case of the State of Florida, where one out of nine po-
tential jurors is black. Under a six-member jury system there is less
than a 50 percent chance a particular jury will include a Black. Under
a 12-member jury system the likelihood of a black juror increases sig-
nificantly. 50
These statistical studies indicate a real basis for the concern that the
cross section will be significantly diminished if the jury is decreased in
size from 12 to 6. They could have been expressly rejected by the
Court had it reasoned that findings regarding the representative nature
of various-sized juries are simply irrelevant. The argument could have
been made that because the constitutionally mandated goal of the ju-
dicial process is merely to provide an adequate cross section of the
community consistent with the needs and demands of the process, 5 ' it
is acceptable that the jury is never truly representative of the commu-
nity. The major reason why juries, regardless of size, do not provide a
true cross section of the community is the effect of social status on the
representativeness of the jury. 52 Although the working class contrib-
utes the greatest percentage of jurors, white-collar workers and profes-
sionals are selected as foremen three and one-half times more often
than members of the working class. The amount of participation is
sharply differentiated between higher than expected percentages for
white-collar and clerical workers, and lower than expected percen-
tages for skilled and unskilled laborers. In all levels men participate in
the deliberations more than women, and women are selected as
foremen only one-fifth as often as would be expected by chance. The
importance of this relation between social status and participation is
highlighted when viewed in conjunction with the parallel relation be-
tween participation and influence. Detailed examinations of
predeliberation awards of individual jurors with the subsequent group
awards in 29 deliberations reveal that the more active jurors shifted
their predeliberation positions less than inactive jurors in the process
50. Id. at 408.
51. See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
52. Consistent with this assertion are statutes which exempt or excuse from jury ser-
vice individuals who are in particular occupations. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §
2.36.080 (Supp. 1973) (persons over 60): § 2.36.120 (1963) (telegraph company em-
ployees): § 38.40.090 (1963) (state militia): § 72.23.050 (1963) (employees of institu-
tions for the mentally ill).
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of agreeing with the group verdict.53 The inevitable conclusion of
these findings is that influence is a function of social status.
Thus even accepting Professor Zeisel's contention that a jury of 12
provides a better cross section of the community than does a jury of 6,
the parallel contention that the smaller jury provides a constitutionally
adequate cross section, when all factors are considered, is difficult to
refute.
Other reasons exist which the Court might have weighed in reaching
its ultimately defensible determination in Williams that there is no dis-
cernible difference between the results of the two different-sized juries.
An example is the possibility of increased variability in verdicts ren-
dered by smaller juries. One of the features of a larger group is that it
will tend to moderate and brake eccentric opinions. Extreme views are
more likely to affect group discussion significantly if the group is
small. Furthermore, the increased possibility that a six-member jury
will deviate from a predictable norm for juries means a larger "gam-
ble" in requesting a jury. This increased risk could well result in an
increase in the incidence of jury waiver and thereby reduce the inci-
dence of jury trials.54
The contentions offered to persuade the Court to depart from the
conclusion it reached in Williams are strong. The Court, apparently
determined not to alter its resolution, could have refuted those conten-
tions more effectively had it relied upon existing empirical evidence to
support its position.
53. Strodtbeck, James & Hawkins, Social Status in Jury Deliberations, 22 AM. Soc.
REV. 713, 715-16 (1957).
54. Zeisel, supra note 11, at 718-19. One commentator, writing in response to the
decision in Williams, contends that as the number of jurors is lowered, the jury's deci-
sion becomes more a matter of chance and less a product of the community's values.
The writer contends further that the Williams Court erred in concluding that criminaljuries of different sizes would return identical verdicts; instead the number of jurors
significantly affects the likelihood of conviction. The methodology which led to the wri-
ter's concluson was to compare the fraction of those potential jurors who had actually
observed the trial and were inclined to consider the defendant guilty at the conclusion of
the courtroom proceedings to the probability of conviction, for each of the two dif-
ferent-sized juries. The results demonstrate that where the fraction is greater than
one-half, the defendant has a better chance of acquittal with a six-member jury. Where
the fraction is less than one-half, the likelihood of conviction is increased with a
six-member jury. Note, The Effect of Jury Size on the Probability of Conviction: An
Evaluation of Williams v. Florida, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 529 (1970).
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III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding that neither the Constitution, the
statute nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure bar a reduction in the
number of jurors to six is commendable for the relief it will provide to
crowded court dockets.55 The problem with the decision lies in the
analysis which brought the Court to the determination that federal civ-
il juries of six are constitutional. While the Court's contention that the
substantive right of trial by jury is determined by jury performance is
sound, the Court did not adequately prove its finding that such per-
formance is not a function of jury size. Yet such proof does exist, for
convincing empirical evidence, as well as the plethora of legal opinion
cited by the Court, provide an adequate body of support for the con-
clusion that there is no difference in the results of the two different-
sized juries. The Court is to be applauded for its conclusion, if not
for the analysis which led to its determination.
Mark S. Davidson
55. Local court rules providing for juries of less than 12 have been adopted in some
55 federal district courts, at least as to some civil cases. 413 U.S. at 150 n.1.
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